Introduction
The wealth of nations is ultimately determined by productivity growth. More productive workers experience higher living standards because increased efficiency allows for greater income and/or leisure. Examining the economic history of mankind in the Handbook of Economic Growth, Oded Galor (2005) points out that productivity increases ended the epoch of Malthusian stagnation in the 1700s and subsequently generated for sustained economic growth. Productivity is also universally acknowledged as the source of the unprecedented rise in human welfare in the past century, when living standards increased six-fold in the US and Germany.
Productivity increases have not been constant. Lackluster growth in the 1970s saw a decline in productivity growth to about two-thirds of its pace in the previous 50 years.
Starting about 1995, however, the US economy productivity growth accelerated again and unemployment fell to levels not seen since the 1960s. Jorgenson (2005) argues that the magnitude of the American growth resurgence outpaced all but the most optimistic expectations. After advances in the productivity measurement allowed for effective accounting of information technology in national statistics (Schreyer, 2001) , it became clear that the recent productivity increases originated with Information and Communication Technology (ICT) investments. The novel characteristics of ICT driven economies led to the coinage of the term the "New Economy."
The hallmark of the New Economy -faster, better, cheaper -is reflected in the dramatic decline of ICT prices (Jorgenson 2005) . Here the focus of ICT studies has generally been on the price of computers, since the foundation of ICT innovations is often thought to originate with tangible hardware improvements (e.g., Moore's Law; Moore, 1965) . In this paper we take an alternate view. Instead of focusing on the hardware and equipment side of ICT, we examine the software side, which is the interface that ultimately translates computing power into productivity increases.
The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Grimm, 1998) first reported rapidly falling prices of computing, but did not recognize software as an investment good in its National Income Product Accounts until 1999 (it was previously classified as "intermediate consumption"). Most European statistical offices do not provide actual statistics for software as an investment good, although the OECD does provide software investment estimates (see Ahmad, 2003) . Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b) contend that the initial ICT prices in the national accounts seriously underestimate the quality adjusted change in software and communications technology prices. They developed new hedonic price indices, which then highlighted the dramatic decline in these two ICT components' costs to manufacturers (see Figure 1 ).
While the fall in computing prices and the rise in computing power are well documented, the dramatic decline in software prices and the associated increase in functionality is often not the explicit focus of productivity analyses. However, swiftly falling software prices provide not only added economic incentives to adopt new software, they also reduce the quality adjusted cost of existing and new ICT hardware. This leads to an accelerated substitution of all forms of ICT investment for other capital and labor services.
Software price declines thus have a doubly enabling effect: first is the increase in the productivity of hardware and second is the elevated efficiency of workers using hardware with a more efficient interface. Finally, while computer and communication investments might constitute the lions' share of the expenses of ICT capital investment, the value added share attributed to software is about twice the size of computing and communication combined (Figure 2) . 1 We see this as yet another reason to motivate a thorough analysis of software investment as a determinant of the productivity fortunes of nations.
In this paper we focus on software investment in Germany. 1 Value added is a measure of output that represents revenue minus the non-labor costs of inputs. 2 A full description and documentation of the data is available in Roehn et al. (2007) and the data is available at faculty.washington.edu/te/growthaccounting.
The Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database has three unique features. First, it provides information on an unusually large number of capital stocks and capital services at the industry-level. Second, the industry-level assets include three different ICT asset types:
computer and office equipment, communication equipment, and software. Among these, software is of particular interest in this paper to illuminate the German productivity performance in the past decade. Third, the detailed disaggregation of the different asset types and marginal productivities (measured as user costs) in the database allows us to construct the most accurate measures of software and non software capital services.
Our dataset allows us to separate industries into software intensive and non software intensive industries. Here we follow a broad literature that established categories for ICTIntensive and non ICT intensive industries by using the capital shares. In our case, we use the most traditional measure (Stiroh and Botsch, 2007) and identify those industries as software intensive whose software capital depth (software capital per hours worked) exceed the median.
3 Table 1 reports all industries and their software intensity classification.
Similar data on ICT investment is available at the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre, which focuses on international productivity comparisons. Differences between the Ifo
Industry Growth Accounting Database and the Groningen Industry Growth Accounting
Database are discussed in Eicher and Roehn (2007) . Important for our purposes is that Groningen reports 26 industries, while Eicher and Roehn (2007) report data for 52 industries.
Most importantly, however, German software investments are not reported by the German Statistical Office, and the Groningen database assumes that a fixed fraction of intangible assets is software. Groningen then generates German industry-level software investment by using a ratio of software to ICT equipment investment that was obtained from an average of French, Dutch and US data.
Instead, the Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database obtains data on software investment shares in total intangible assets, and industry-level software investment from a ifo Institute study by Herrmann and Mueller (1997) , and from surveys conducted by the Ifo Investment Survey. 4 As detailed in Herrmann and Mueller (1997) Results are even more dramatic in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, which is the portion of output growth that is commonly attributed to technical change. The overall contribution of TFP to labor productivity growth has been puzzlingly low in Germany. We resolve the puzzle and show that the reasons for this low contribution lies in the diverging paths that software and non software intensive industries have taken since 1991. TFP declined consistently in non software intensive industries to generate about a 15% drag on German labor productivity, while TFP rose steadily in software intensive industries to generate an astonishing 35% contribution to labor productivity growth between 2000-2004.
Overall the results combine to provide a clear picture of rising capital deepening and TFP growth in software intensive sectors, contrasting with falling capital deepening and increasingly negative TFP growth in non software intensive sectors.
Formal econometric tests of the differential growth rates in (non-)software intensive industries to labor productivity growth are even more revealing. Pre 1995, the mean growth rate of software intensive industries is already one percentage point greater than non software intensive industries. Post 1995, German industries experience a dramatic bifurcation. Labor productivity in non software intensive industries declines in excess of one percentage point.
In sharp contrast, labor productivity in software intensive industries accelerated by another 1.5 percentage points to a strong 5% growth rate. The acceleration was not uniform across software intensive industries. The median change in labor productivity among software intensive industries was actually negative. Much of the growth was driven by above median software intensive industries that saw growth increases of about 10%.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.1 gives a brief overview of the underlying growth accounting methodology in the Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database and Section 2.2 discusses the resulting contributions of software and non software intensive industries to productivity growth. Section 3 provides the econometric framework to estimate the influence of software intensity productivity. Section 4 concludes.
Deriving Industry Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth

Methodology
Our methodology to disentangle the various contributions in German labor productivity growth follows Eicher and Roehn (2007) , who outline the German growth accounting paradigm for the Ifo Industry Growth Accounting Database. Industry contributions to aggregate productivity are calculated using the Jorgenson, Gallop and Fraumeni (1987) productivity framework that is commonly applied in most productivity studies. 5 Industrylevel gross output growth are then decomposed into input and TFP contributions according to
where i Y is gross output for industry i, To relate industry gross output growth to value added output growth we rewrite (1) as
where i V is value added and i V , ν is the nominal share of value added in gross output of industry i. Combining equations (1) and (2), yields industry value added growth
Defining aggregate output as the weighted average of industry value added,
, and i w as the average share of industry value added in aggregate value added, we can combine this expression with (3) to obtain
Note that ( ) i
represents the "Domar-weighted" industry-level TFP growth
where the "Domar-weights" are given by the quotient of the share of industry value added in aggregate value added, and the share of industry value added in industry gross output.
We are interested specifically in the industry contributions to average labor productivity, V/H, where H is the unweighted sum of industry hours,
, , over all j labor types.
The growth rate of labor productivity is then
, which yields after substituting for value added in (4)
The first term on the right hand side represents direct industry contributions to APL growth and H R reflects the reallocation of hours. 6 Defining
, and i q ln ∆ as software capital deepening, non software capital deepening and labor quality growth, (4) and (5) yield
where
is the growth rate of labor quality. The APL decomposition in (6) has the advantage that input contributions or TFP contributions to APL from any industry subset simply equal the (weighted) sum of the contributions from all industries in the subset. 6 The contribution of an industry to aggregate reallocation of hours is positive if an industry with an ALP level above (below) the aggregate average level experiences positive (negative) growth in hours.
Contribution of Software to Productivity Growth
To measure productivity, we examine labor productivity growth that is averaged over the periods 1991-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2004. 1991 is the earliest data available for Germany, and 2004 is the latest industry output data available from the German Statistical Office.
Averaging is standard to account for cyclical productivity fluctuations, and the time intervals are chosen to coincide with well documented trend breaks in the US productivity data.
Labor productivity can be decomposed into four components: changes in 1) hours worked, 2) labor quality, 3) capital deepening (the increase in the amount and quality of capital available to workers), and 4) total factor productivity (productivity increases in all other factors that increase the productivity of labor). Capital deepening and total factor productivity can be disaggregated further into contributions from software intensive industries and non software intensive industries. Table 2 displays the growth accounting results for the three sample periods. First we note that German productivity has been in decline since 1991. This decline has been attributed to a lack of ICT investment . In the US, strong ICT investments more than offset the reductions in non-ICT capital deepening and total factor productivity in the US (Stiroh and Botsch 2007) . Table 2 isolates the contributions from the four broad sources of productivity growth.
By far the largest contribution is derived from capital deepening. From 1991-2000, 44% of German labor productivity growth was generated by additional capital services that raised the productivity of the labor force. Post 2000, this share increased to 67%. Among industries that increased labor productivity though capital investment, we can distinguish the contributions from software intensive and other industries. In 1991-1995 the capital deepening contributions of the two types of industries was about equal, 23% vs. 21% for software intensive and other industries, respectively. However, post 1995, a bifurcation commences where software intensive industries began to increase their capital deepening dramatically to contribute ever more strongly to labor productivity growth (rising to 53% in 2000-2004) .
Capital deepening in software intensive industries declined over the same period to a mere 15%. The important contribution of capital deepening to German labor productivity growth is thus not only driven by software intensive industries capital investment and capital deepening, but these industries actually offset the decline of non software intensive industries between 1991 and 2004.
The second important category of productivity determinants is TFP, which is the portion of output growth not explained changes in the quantity of inputs used in production. It is often directly associated with technical change, but it may also capture changes in market structure or capacity utilization. Endogenous growth models in the 1990s link TFP growth rates directly to innovation. Specifically, R&D subsidies and an abundance of skilled labor are shown to reduce the marginal cost of conducting R&D and increase the rate of innovation development and therefore, the TFP growth rate (Comin, 2006) . Solow (1956) originally outlined a framework that linked cross-country differences in TFP with cross-country differences in income per capita. This is confirmed in extensive research, see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) , who highlight that the majority of income differences between countries are associated to differences in TFP.
Overall, the contribution of TFP to German productivity growth is unusually small. The relationship between software intensity and TFP performance becomes especially poignant when we examine the scatter plots for labor and TFP productivity in Figures 3a)-c) .
They juxtapose labor productivity and total factor productivity for our three sample periods.
The industry-level correlations between the two productivities are unusually high, all are greater than 0.9. This highlights the close relationship between efficiency and technological change in software intensive sectors and the labor productivity growth generated in response.
Therefore we can establish not only an aggregate positive effect generated by software intensive industries' TFP on labor productivity, but there also seems to be a close relationship at the industry-level.
The residual labor productivity is generated by labor quality growth, which hovered around a 10% contribution and by the reallocation of hours which has been declining from about 30% to 10% from [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] 
Sources of the German Productivity Divergence
We employ difference-in-difference regressions to quantify the divergence in TFP and labor productivity growth rates across industry types. We commence by outlining the formal framework pioneered by Stiroh (2002) and applied to Germany by Eicher and Roehn (2007) .
Formally, the difference-in-difference specification can be written as
where t i TFP , ln ∆ is annual TFP productivity growth of industry i in year t, α is a constant, SOFTINTENSIVE is a dummy variable set to 1 for software-intensive industries, and POST T is a dummy variable set to 1 for observation after year T and to 0 otherwise.
The interpretation of the coefficients in this regression is as follows. α is the mean growth rate for non software intensive industries in the period prior to the break year. α+β is the mean growth rate for software-intensive industries prior to the break year. γ is the acceleration for non software intensive industries after the break year, and γ+δ is the acceleration for software-intensive industries after the break point. δ is the differential acceleration of software-intensive industries relative to others and is the coefficient of primary interest. The additional columns in Table 3 report quantile regressions. 7 Like OLS, the estimated coefficients in quantile difference-in-difference regressions can be interpreted as marginal effects. Quantiles are useful measures because they highlight long tailed distributions and potential outliers, which may be important to our investigation since we are interested in identifying exactly the contributors to productivity performance. Quantile regressions subdivide the population into quantile segments, each with equal proportions.
The quantiles are then given by the data values that mark the boundaries between consecutive subsets. This approach provides richer information than ordinary least squares, which simply estimates the mean effect of a regressor, without taking into account the potential heterogeneity of industries' productivity growth rates. Changes in the mean growth rate (estimated using OLS) might be driven by only a few industries and the distribution of productivity growth might also be fundamentally different across software intensive and non software intensive industries.
Below we sketch the conditional quantile regression technique. Let (y i , x i ), i=1,…,n, be a sample of industry productivities from a population where x i is a ( ) This allows us to define the conditional quantile as (7) and the interpretations of the parameters estimates are identical to our discussion of (7). Table 4 reports the labor productivity results that are qualitatively similar to those in 
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the effects of the software intensity of industries on productivity growth in Germany. Software prices have fallen exponentially since 1960. This dramatic decline in costs led not only to the substitution towards more software investment, but it also increased productivity of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) hardware. ICT investment has previously been shown to be a crucial driver of productivity growth, especially in OECD countries. Previous decompositions of productivity growth focused on the contributions of aggregate ICT investment (computer, telecommunication and software).
In this paper we focus on software alone. Value added shares of software and computer services are about twice as large as the computer and telecommunication hardware shares combined. In addition, software is the crucial interface that ultimately determines the productivity improvement of all ICT investments.
The precipitous decline in software prices has led to the continuous substitution of software and computer hardware for other types of capital or labor services. Here we use the Labor productivity grew significantly faster in software intensive industries, as compared to non software intensive industries. Post 1995 labor productivity growth in non software intensive industries declined by a statistically significant 1.5 percentage points while it increased in software intensive industries by 1.4 percentage points. This acceleration was not uniform across software intensive industries. Much of the growth was driven by above median software intensive industries that saw a large increase in growth of around 10%. 75% of these contributions are generated by software investments in prepackaged software, as opposed to own account software purchases. 4.0 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 4.0 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 Table 3 Total Factor Productivity Growth By Industry Type (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) Notes: The Post-1995 dummy equals 1 if t > 1995, 0 otherwise. The software-intensive dummy equals 1 for industries whose software capital services share per hours worked exceed the German median from 1991-2004, 0 otherwise. Quantile regressions identify the coefficients for industries at the z th -quantile percentile of the productivity distribution. All regressions are pooled regressions, standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors were applied for OLS allowing for correlation within industries over time. Stand errors for quantile regressions are derived via bootstrap techniques for 1000 replications. Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Linear composite effects are calculated using the Delta method. (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) Notes: The Post-1995 dummy equals 1 if t > 1995, 0 otherwise. The software-intensive dummy equals 1 for industries whose software capital services share per hours worked exceed the German median from 1991-2004, 0 otherwise. Quantile regressions identify the coefficients for industries at the z th -quantile percentile of the productivity distribution. All regressions are pooled regressions, standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors were applied for OLS allowing for correlation within industries over time. Stand errors for quantile regressions are derived via bootstrap techniques for 1000 replications. Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Linear composite effects are calculated using the Delta method. 
